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What now, what next—kairotic coding and the unfolding future
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Emma Cocker
School of Art and Design, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, UK
ABSTRACT
Drawing on my experience as a critical interlocutor within the AHRC research
projects Live Notation: Transforming Matters of Performance (2012) and
Weaving Codes | Coding Weaves (2014–2016), in this article, I propose a
conceptual framework for considering the challenges and opportunities for
kairotic improvisation within live coding, conceived as an embodied mode of
imminent and immanent intervention and invention-in-the-middle, a practice
of radical timing and timeliness. Expanding my previous reflections on
kairotic coding [Cocker, Emma. (2014). “Live Notation: Reflections on a
Kairotic Practice.” In Performance Research Journal, on Writing and Digital
Media, edited by Jerome Fletcher and Ric Allsopp, 18 (5), 69–76. London:
Routledge; Cocker, Emma. (2016). “Performing Thinking in Action: The Meletē
of Live Coding.” International Journal of Performance Arts and Digital Media 12
(2): 102–116. Cocker, Emma. (2017). “Weaving Codes/Coding Weaves:
Penelopean Mêtis and the Weaver-Coder’s Kairos.” Textile 15 (2): 124–141], in
this article, I address the kairotic liveness within live coding’s improvisational
performance by identifying two seemingly contradictory tendencies within
this burgeoning genre. On the one hand, there is a call for improved media
technologies enabling greater immediacy of semantic feedback supporting a
faster, more fluid—perhaps even virtuoso—approach to improvisation.
Alongside, there remains interest within the live coding community for a
mode of improvisational performativity that harnesses the unpredictable, the
unexpected or as-yet-unknown. Rather than regard these two tendencies in
antagonistic relation, my intent is to invite further debate on how the
development of intelligent machines might better facilitate improvisatory
flow, without eradicating the critical intervals and in-between spaces
necessary for creative invention and intervention, without smoothing away
the points of technical resistance and intransigence which arguably form a
part of live coding’s performative texture.
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In this article, I propose a conceptual frame-
work through which to consider the challenges
and opportunities for kairotic improvisation
within live coding, conceived as an embodied
mode of imminent and immanent intervention
and invention-in-the-middle, a practice of rad-
ical timing and timeliness.1 Whilst the terms
kairos, kairotic improvisation and kairotic cod-
ing are elaborated and unpacked in more
depth as the article unfolds, the definition of
kairos adopted draws on its dual meaning,
where it is used to refer to both a temporal
‘opening’—a cut or ‘nick’ in time—and a ‘will-
to-invent’ capable of responding to this opening
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in the ‘living present’ (White 1987). Expanding
the concept of kairotic coding that I developed
in previous research (Cocker 2014, 2016,
2017), within this article my focus shifts to
address the kairotic liveness within live coding’s
improvisational performance by identifying two
seemingly contradictory tendencies within this
burgeoning genre. On the one hand, there is a
call for improved media technologies enabling
greater immediacy of semantic feedback, a
shift towards predictive coding modelled on
previous patterns and habits supporting a faster,
more fluid—perhaps even virtuoso—species of
programming improvisation. Alongside, there
remains interest within the live coding commu-
nity for a mode of improvisational performativ-
ity that harnesses the unpredictable, the
unexpected or as-yet-unknown, where perform-
ance emerges as a vital site for experimental
exploration, the live event of ‘thinking-in-
action’.2
My intent is to draw attention to the different
futurities within these two approaches: the
difference within performance between a tech-
nologically predicted ‘future’ based on what
has-been, and the ever-emergent, living instant
of the future conceived as ‘what now, what
next’, the ‘to-come’. This philosophical reflec-
tion on the temporal experience within digital
improvisation seeks to foreground the centrality
of attending to an expanded sense of the present
within live coding, emphasizing the ‘flow’ of
real-time action, the criticality of the moment,
alongside both the risk and skillfulness required
in engaging with the unknown. Yet, rather than
posit technological improvements in antagon-
istic or oppositional relation to the unpredict-
able potential of live coding, my aim is to
invite further debate on how the development
of intelligent machines might better facilitate
improvisatory flow, without eradicating the
critical intervals and in-between spaces necess-
ary for creative invention and intervention,
without smoothing away the points of technical
resistance and intransigence which arguably
form a part of live coding’s performative
texture. How might technological innovation
increase the potential for inventive forms of
improvisatory performance, where a heightened
level of collaboration or co-improvisation with
machines allows for the emergence of the unex-
pected, by combining increased performance
capacity with a continued embrace of risk and
uncertainty, error and failure? Indeed, how
might predictive technologies—perhaps coun-
ter-intuitively—enable that which cannot be
predicted in advance, a truly experimental or
surprising mode of improvisation made poss-
ible through a more intuitive collaboration
between human and non-human?
Live coding’s thinking-in-action
Whilst my article examines the challenges and
opportunities for creative interaction between
humans and computer systems alongside the
scope for improvisational invention therein,
my reflections are based on experiences—obser-
vations, encounters and conversations—from
within two distinct research projects rather
than making a general claim about all forms
of digital creativity. Specifically, I draw from
my experience as a critical interlocutor within
two recent live coding-related research projects,
Live Notation: Transforming Matters of Per-
formance (2012) and Weaving Codes | Coding
Weaves (2014–2016), that in different ways
addressed questions related to the liveness of
improvisational ‘thinking-in-action’ at the
interface between human and machine, by
examining how digital technologies have the
capacity to enhance as well as limit the potential
for human creativity; to both augment and
diminish—activate and inhibit—the develop-
ment of human dexterity, attention, cognitive
agility and tactical intelligence. For Erin Man-
ning and Brian Massumi (2014), this notion of
‘thinkings-in-the-act’ or ‘thought in the act’
refers to the immanent movement of thought
as it is performed, activated only in-and-
through practice. Here, thinking-in-action
could be conceived akin to the ‘immanent
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intensification’ of thinking that Alain Badiou
(2005, 58) (following Nietzsche) asserts ‘is not
effectuated anywhere else than where it is
given—thought is effective in situ, it is what
… is intensified upon itself, or again, it is the
movement of its own intensity’.
Whilst my own interest in ‘thinking-in-
action’ has been explored in-and-through var-
ious practice-based artistic research projects,
in this article I refer specifically to the practice
of live coding, a form of digital improvisation
that explicitly foregrounds the real-time charac-
ter of computational processes. Broadly speak-
ing, live coding describes the improvisatory
composition of predominantly computer-gen-
erated audio-visual material, where the writing
of code itself—or other executable instructions
—is presented as a live event for an audience.3
Significantly, the writing of code is not just
the means for generating audio-visual material,
but additionally, this process is often folded into
the audio-visual experience itself. Alongside
witnessing the coder physically labouring at
their laptop, the code itself is also presented—
often projected—live as it is being worked on
as a visible part of the performance. Live coding
is a revelatory practice intent on the ‘showing of
the screen’, revealing the decision-making and
working out within coding, the source code or
operational principles as they are being written.
As Nick Collins, Alex McLean, Julian Rohrhu-
ber, and Adrian Ward note (2003, 321), live
coders ‘work with programming languages,
building their own custom software, tweaking
or writing the programs themselves as they per-
form’. Live coding is thus characterized by the
ability to interact with a running system that
is not stopped whilst waiting for new pro-
gramme statements: the focus is on the writing
of code simultaneous to its use. Code is written
as it is performed; a practice that is variously
referred to as ‘coding on the fly’, ‘just-in-time
coding’ or else as ‘kairotic coding’ (Crocker,
2014), an original concept that I proposed for
describing the immanent improvisatory quality
within certain live coding practices.
Kairotic coding: initial
conceptualisation
My initial conceptualization of the improvisa-
tory nature of kairotic coding emerged as a
response to the research project Live Notation:
Transforming Matters of Performance (2012),
funded by the UK Arts and Humanities
Research Council’s ‘Digital Transformations’
theme. Exploring the possibilities of relating
live coding (performing with programming
languages) and live art (performing with
actions), the Live Notation project was led by
co-investigators Alex McLean and Hester
Reeve working in dialogue with an international
network of artists, coders and theorists, includ-
ing Sam Aaron, Geoff Cox, Yuen Fong Ling,
Dave Griffiths, Thor Magnusson, Brigid
McLeer, Kate Sicchio, Andre Stitt, Wrong-
headed andMaria X, who collectively comprised
the Live Notation Unit. On 27 July 2012, I wit-
nessed theLiveNotationUnit stage a symposium
and series of performances atArnolfini (an inter-
national arts centre and gallery) in Bristol, UK,
conceived as an ‘experimental laboratory’ in
which to approach programming as perform-
ance art, performance art notation as code,
code as speech, bodies as interpreters, involving
improvisational sound works (where computer
code and the artists’ bodies become instruments)
and site-specific time-based art works (where
notation becomes the ‘piece’ as opposed to its
recording device). McLean and Reeve (2012)
conceived the term ‘live notation’ and principle
of live-ness as a means of shared resonance for
connecting live art and live coding, asserting
that, ‘live notation is an intrinsic part of live
work—for both body and code. In this we con-
sider notation as not being something that pre-
cedes, defines or is created by a performance,
but as activity that resonates within a perform-
ance’. The model of ‘liveness’ within this project
privileged the durational, embodied, non-repea-
table moment of performance, drawing atten-
tion to an improvisatory species of liveness
wherein the mode of articulation emerges as a
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live event simultaneous to the unfolding experi-
ence, rather than as live re-activation of a pre-
existing script or score that was rehearsed or
planned in advance.
Kairos—will-to-invent
My assertion is that the improvisatory tendency
encountered within the Live Notation project
could be conceived as kairotic improvisation, a
practice alert to the live circumstances of its
own production, capable of creating the con-
ditions for whilst simultaneously responding to
the contingencies within its own emergence.
Whilst some historical and philosophical con-
textualisation of the term kairos is required, my
intent is not to offer an exhaustive analysis for
as Thomas Rickert (2013, 75) argues, ‘the mean-
ing of the Greek word kairos is itself murky
because of its various usages’; its definition shift-
ing, contradictory and therefore lacking direct or
exact translation. Indeed, though the tempor-
ality of kairos has been conceived in messianic
terms as well as to refer to the notion of ‘due
measure’, propriety and decorum, my own
reflections draw on the Ancient Greek rhetorical
conceptualization where kairos is often taken to
mean ‘timing’ or the ‘right time’, a ‘decisive’ criti-
cal moment whose fleeting opportunity must be
grasped before it passes. Kairos thus describes a
qualitatively differentmode of time to that of lin-
ear or chronological time (chronos): not an
abstract measure of time passing but of time
ready to be seized, an expression of timeliness,
a critical juncture where something could hap-
pen. For Eric Charles White (1987, 13), kairos
has origins in two different sources: archery,
where it describes ‘an opening or “opportunity”
… through which the archer’s arrow has to pass’
and weaving where there is ‘a “critical time”
when the weaver must draw the yarn through a
gap that momentarily opens in the warp of the
cloth being woven’. Etymologically related to
the Greek word keirein—to cut—kairos can be
conceived thus as both a temporal ‘opening’ or
critical moment (a ‘nick’ in time) and, inWhite’s
terms, a ‘will-to-invent’ capable of responding to
this opening.
The ‘on-the-fly’ nature of live coding res-
onates with White’s (1987, 13) articulation of
kairos as ‘adaption to an always mutating situ-
ation. Understood as a principle of invention
… kairos therefore counsels thought to act
always, as it were, on the spur of the moment’.
For White (1987, 13),
Such an activity of invention would renew
itself and be transformed from moment to
moment as it evolves and adapts itself to
newly emergent contexts. The fluid and rela-
tive moments of the immediate situation
would be constitutively involved in the inven-
tion process, which would become an impro-
visational one.
He asserts that (1987, 54–55) kairos describes
an improvisational capacity that is ‘contempor-
ary with itself, alert and able to adapt to the pre-
sent occasion’, where ‘kairos is offered with the
understanding, then, that thought must always
be willing, as circumstances change, to being
again’ (1987, 17). Kairotic improvisation
involves letting go of or loosening one’s attach-
ment to any preconceived ideas for the unfold-
ing of a performance, surrendering to the
contingencies within each new situation.
Indeed, whilst some forms of laptop perform-
ance (including live coding) might use pre-
existing or pre-recorded samples that become
combined through a process of improvisation
during the live event (that are effectively pre-
composed anterior to the situation and then
modiﬁed through live performance), live coding
provides the capacity for real-time composition
including the possibility of ‘beginning from
scratch’ or from the ‘blank screen’.
Kairotic futurity
However, kairotic liveness does not involve the
valorization of spontaneity and originality as
indicative of authenticity: Philip Auslander
(1999) has long since complicated any clear dis-
tinction between live and mediated
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performance. Indeed, the live coder might well
draw on an existing archive of samples and
code threads that have been generated in
advance. However, whilst some modes of digital
performance would use these components
within an already configured structure that
accesses the ‘has-been’ in order to repeat as
before, within a kairotic practice the future per-
formance is ever-emergent, ontologically living
as much as live. For Maxine Sheets-Johnson
(2009) (dance), ‘improvisation is the incarna-
tion of creativity as process. Its future is thus
open. Where it will go any moment, what will
happen next, no one knows; until the precise
moment at which it ends, its integrity as an art-
work is uncharted’. The difference in liveness—
even aliveness—between kairotic improvisation
and forms of performance whose destination is
planned in advance could be further elaborated
in relation to the different species of temporality
and futurity operating therein. Drawing on the
philosophical work of Catherine Malabou,
Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Derrida, Jean-
Paul Martinon (2007) asks, ‘How does one
address the coming of the future?’ Turning to
the French language, Martinon (2007, 1) ident-
ifies two different words for the future: le futur
and l’avenir. The first—le futur—he states, ‘refers
to something distant or remote, possible, or
probable… Le futur supposes in fact the possi-
bility of projection, predictions, and prophecies’.
Whilst le futur is concerned with ‘what will or
might be’, l’avenir, as Martinon (2007, 1) notes,
‘is usually translated as…what is “yet-to-
come”’. Though different, both models refer to
the future as a linear continuation of time
where as Martinon (2007, 15) notes, time is
‘always one-dimensional and unidirectional; it
goes towards the future’. Against this logic, he
attempts to reinvent the term futurity by draw-
ing on the radical potential of a third term: à-
venir (the expression of the ‘to-come’).
For Martinon (2007, 4–5), à-venir ‘rep-
resents an “unhinging”’, a ‘spacing (and) tem-
porizing’ which ‘interrupts the present’
‘breaking up… the measurable linearity of
space and time’. According to Martinon (2007,
7), ‘à-venir surges between the foreseeable, “pro-
jectable”, “plannable”, and programmable
future present and the radical future, that is…
that which exceeds or is more than this future
possibility’. The concept à-venir refers to a gap
or ‘creative interval’ between the ‘as is’ of the
present and the ‘not yet’ of the future; not the
‘not yet’ of the future conceived as a continu-
ation of the present, but rather that of the ‘to-
come’. Philosopher Antonio Negri conceptual-
izes this ‘to-come’ as the evental ‘time for revo-
lution’, as kairòs. He describes kairòs as the
‘restless’ instant where naming and the thing
named attain existence (in time), for which he
draws example from the way that the poet
‘vacillating, fixes the verse’ (Negri 2003, 153).
For Negri (2003, 152), kairòs describes ‘being’s
act of leaning out over the void of time to-
come, i.e. the adventure beyond the edge of
time’. Accordingly he argues that, ‘Kairòs is
the modality of time through which being
opens itself, attracted by the void at the limit
of time, and it thus decides to fill that void
(Negri 2003, 152). Negri (2003, 152) conceives
the limit experience of kairós as one of ‘being
on the brink’, as ‘being on a razor’s edge’, a
point of rupture, of decision. Rather than ima-
gining the future as already existing (that can
be predicted in advance), conceptualizations
such as à-venir and kairós propose the possi-
bility of a radical future, borne of rupture, dis-
continuity and of necessary invention.
Invention-in-the-middle: an embodied
practice
Unlike some computer-generated performances
that involve the activation of an algorithm con-
ceived in advance and simply let to run its
course, within live coding running algorithms
have the capacity to be interrupted, rewritten,
their course changed. Rather than giving over
responsibility to the inevitability of an algor-
ithm’s logic, within live coding the performer
consciously adopts a medial position, actively
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maintaining the conditions that will keep the
unfolding of action dynamic. Debra Hawhee
(2002, 18) conceptualizes the medial position
of ‘invention-in-the-middle’ as a kairotic move-
ment involving ‘simultaneous extending out-
wards and folding back’; it is a ‘space-time
which marks the emergence of a pro-visional
“subject”, one that works on—and is worked
on by—the situation’. Here, the opportunity of
kairos requires the perceptions and actions of
an individual capable of seizing its potential
through inventive means. Hawhee (2004, 75)
argues how a kairotic practice necessitates a
sense of ‘immanent awareness’, ‘embodied
thought-in-motion’ and ‘instinctual… bodily
capacity for instantaneous response’. Whilst
Hawhee (2004, 67) is referring to Ancient rheto-
ric and athletics, the mode of ‘rhythmic, embo-
died practice’ that she articulates seems to
correspond with the improvisational modality
of live coding. More than a logical or purely
conceptual procedure, kairotic coding involves
a sense of embodied awareness, where prin-
ciples of knowing how and knowing when are
privileged as much as knowing what. Indeed,
the improvisatory practice of live coding does
not just involve the logical or rational manipu-
lation of code language; it unfolds as much
through a form of kinaesthetic knowledge, the
complex embodied relation of rhythm, rep-
etition and response. Maxine Sheets-Johnson
(2009, 11) uses the term ‘kinesthetic memory’
to address the question of ‘how we do what
we do’: she draws on Aleksandr Romanovich
Luria’s terms kinetic melody and kinesthetic
melody, to explain how a ‘complex sequential
activity unfolds… how muscular innervations
and denervations are temporally ordered in
the performance of any skilled movement’.4
Weaving Codes – thought–in-motion
Operating as a critical interlocutor within the
AHRC research projectWeaving Codes | Coding
Weaves (2014–2016) provided a context for
further exploring the specificity of thinking-in-
action whilst improvising within a live running
code and how might it relate to the embodied
or even kinaesthetic ‘thought-in-motion’
(Hawhee 2004, 75) activated whilst working on
the loom. Led by principle investigators Ellen
Harlizius-Klück and Alex McLean, working
with collaborative developer Dave Griffiths,
Weaving Codes | Coding Weaves involved the
radical recuperation of a largely ignored relation
between ancient weaving and computational
thinking, emphasizing the epistemological con-
nection between these two practices above the
habitually foregrounded technical evolution of
their respective hardware. Rather than conceive
the connection between weaving and coding
through the prism of machinic mass-production
and its privileged concepts of optimization, effi-
ciency, productivity and standardization, the
shared research quest was towards finding a
language for describing the interweaving of mul-
tiple methods not possible to accommodate
within standard mass-production design—tech-
niques involving the complex collaboration and
co-operation between human and machine, or
that are predicated on the activation of an impro-
visatory form of embodied knowledge. Ancient
loomweaving and live coding both involve a tac-
tile—even tactical—system of physical and cog-
nitive dexterity, the interplay of hand, eye and
mind, the cultivation of a processual working
knowledge such that it becomes ingrained in
mind and muscle, activated at the fingertips,
live and emergent to the situation. Indeed,
there is an inherent physical, kinetic—even
kinaesthetic—dimension to the live writing of
code, through the physical engagement with
themachine: a sensorimotormovement vocabu-
lary of micro-adjustments, changes and shifts
performed in the frantic keystrokes, in the shut-
tling of the cursor around the screen, in the flash
points of activation and execution.
Kairotic improvisation and flow states
The form of human–computer interaction
within live coding foregrounds an active rather
DIGITAL CREATIVITY 87
than passive relation to technology; a more
complex, nuanced or even entangled relation,
where technology is not so much put to use as
worked-with, the process unfolding through
attending to—even collaborating with—the
resistance exerted by the technology or appar-
atus rather than conceiving it simply as a tool
that needs to be brought under control, mas-
tered. Rather than reducing the role of the
human operator, live coding requires heigh-
tened levels of dexterity, attention, cognitive
agility and tactical intelligence; it is a practice
of timing and timeliness, of biding one’s time
and knowing when to act. Kairos is experienced
in-the-midst-of whilst simultaneously felt as
out-of-time, the event of kairotic timeliness or
ex-temporising operating outside or beyond
the temporal frame of chronos. The immanent
and embodied thought-in-motion within such
an improvisatory practice might be described
in terms of ‘flow’ or ‘flow state’. Often conceived
as synonymous with ‘being in the zone’, flow
describes a hyper-focused state of ‘optimal
experience’—or mental state—conceptualized
by psychologist Mihály Csíkszentmihályi
(2002, 53) as ‘full absorption’, immersion or
‘total involvement’ in the process of an activity,
where the individual stops ‘being aware of
themselves as separate from the actions they
are performing’. Csíkszentmihályi argues that
flow states involve an experiential transform-
ation of time, alongside the merging of action
and awareness: actions become spontaneous,
even automatic—intrinsically rather than
extrinsically meaningful. Here, Csíkszentmihá-
lyi (2002, 69) states, ‘Life is justified in the pre-
sent, instead of being held hostage to a
hypothetical future gain’. Indeed, live coding—
like many other improvisatory practices—
involves states of heightened concentration
and temporal disorientation, where an intrinsic
value is placed on the process in-and-of-itself.
For Csíkszentmihályi (2002, 64), flow is also
characterized by loss of self-consciousness.
However, this does not mean that the individual
remains unaware of his or her actions; rather, it
enables an expansion of attention beyond the
‘boundaries of our being’, which as Csíkszent-
mihályi (2002, 64) claims is ‘based on a concrete
experience of close interaction with some Other,
an interaction that produces a rare sense of
unity with these usually foreign entities’. It is
perhaps in this sense, that the live coder ‘collab-
orates’ with his or her technology through a
process of interaction in a ‘system of action’
that is greater than the intentions of the individ-
ual self, that involves letting go of self-conscious
control whilst maintaining a heightened sense
of mental activity and the activation of one’s
skill commensurate to the challenge. Indeed,
Csíkszentmihályi (2002, 54) argues that
although ‘flow experience appears to be effort-
less, it is far from being so. It often requires
strenuous physical exertion or highly disci-
plined mental activity. It does not happen with-
out the application of skilled performance. Any
lapse in concentration will erase it’. Accord-
ingly, the optimal experience of flow depends
on achieving the ‘sweet spot’ of desirable diffi-
culty between the nature of the challenge and
one’s available skill, between one’s intention
and capacity. Echoing many of the character-
istics identified within Csíkszentmihályi’s
articulation of flow, Sheets-Johnson asserts
that (dance), ‘improvisation is process through
and through, a form which lives and breathes
only in the moving flow of its creation, a flow
experienced as an ongoing present […] to create
an unbroken now […] an ongoing flow of
movement from an ever-changing kinetic
world of possibilities’. She states that (2009,
29), improvisation is ‘either in the process of
being created—in the very process of being
born—or it is not at all’. However, for Sheets-
Johnson (2009, 35), the ‘way of being in the
world’ within thinking in movement is ‘not
the work of a symbol-making body, a body
mediating its way through the world by means
of a language’. Yet, the improvisatory nature
of live coding is exactly ‘by means of a
language’: it is a form of improvisation predi-
cated on the live writing of code; moreover,
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activated in-and-through the mediation of
technology.
Improvisation through mediation
So how might the numerical-linguistic-sym-
bolic mediation operating within live coding
impact on its potential for improvisatory states
of embodied, kairotic flow? Indeed, for Hawhee
(2004, 70) ‘kairotic impulses’ ‘are not limited to
a seat of reason or conscious adherence to a set
of precepts’ but rather, the bodily capacity for
instinctive response can be habituated, such
that they become intuitive. Herein too, live cod-
ing deviates from the ancient kairotic practices,
since its unfolding processes are non-intuitive,
even counter-intuitive. In coding, there is
often no intuitive relation between action and
result: the subtlest modifications within the pro-
cess—small changes to the code thread—have
the capacity to affect unexpected change.
Indeed, in changing the programme as it is run-
ning there is an inherent risk of failure, where
small typing errors can result in the production
of code that is unable to execute at all. For
Csíkszentmihályi (2002, 56), to achieve a state
of flow there should be a focused sense of inten-
tion: he states that even where a clear sense of
‘goal’ or outcome has not been ‘set in advance’,
one should still be able to gauge ‘Yes, this works;
no, this doesn’t’. However, in order to activate
these micro-decisions from ‘in the zone’ of
flow it is necessary to receive ‘immediate
feedback’.
Herein, lies one further challenge for the
improvisatory live coder, for whilst live coding
is described as a mode of real-time composition,
in reality, there is a lag—due to technical latency
—between the writing of code and its execution.
There is an inescapable delay in the feedback
loop between action (writing of code) and the
effects of code’s activation. Feedback is non-
immediate such that within the live and present
moment, the live coder is both attending to the
unfolding of their live performance (based on
their coding actions frommoment’s past) whilst
also setting up the conditions for what will
come next. The coder’s attention is split
between the present-of-the-present moment
(the as is) and a ‘future-of-the-present moment’
(the yet-to-come). This lag further complicates
the issue of the liveness within live coding:
unlike other forms of live composition, the
relationship between a performer’s actions and
the resulting effects is asynchronous. Or rather,
there are parallel threads of arrhythmic liveness:
the live (yet arguably no longer live) unfolding
of the effects generated through the event of cod-
ing, and the live event of coding writing itself,
both of which are simultaneously experienced
by coder-performer and audience.
Immediacy and timeliness of
feedback: levels of liveness
Whilst the temporal nature of kairotic improvi-
sation might be imagined in terms of its swift-
ness and immediacy, its capacity for quick
response, the practice of live coding must navi-
gate this temporal lag between a decision and its
effects. One issue for digital-human improvisa-
tion within this field of practice could be to
explore how digital technologies and the devel-
opment of ‘intelligent’ machines might better
enable the improvisatory state of kairotic
‘flow’? One response to the ‘problem’ of techni-
cal latency is a call for improved media technol-
ogies enabling greater immediacy or ‘timeliness’
of execution feedback, alongside reducing the
scope for error, effectively making the perform-
ance more ‘real-time’, increasing the perception
of its ‘liveness’. For Steven Tanimoto (2013),
‘liveness’ involves ‘minimizing the latency
between a programming action and seeing its
effect on program execution’; it is a question
of ‘the temporal relationships between pro-
grammer actions and computer responses’.
Tanimoto (1990) developed a hierarchical sys-
tem initially for describing the four different
degrees of liveness within programming: Level
1 (Informative): No semantic feedback about a
program is provided—he argues that this first
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level involves the four separate phases: edit,
compile, link and run. In liveness level 2 (Infor-
mative and Significant), semantic feedback is
available on demand on a selected component,
‘the programmer would do something, would
ask for a response, and some time later, the
computer would respond’ (Tanimoto 2013). In
level 3 (Informative, Significant and Respon-
sive), incremental semantic feedback is auto-
matically provided with an incremental
programme edit: ‘the computer would wait
and sometime after the programmer did some-
thing, would respond’ (Tanimoto 2013). In level
4 (Informative, Significant, Responsive, and
Live), incremental semantic feedback is auto-
matically provided for other data events such
as mouse clicks or exceptions, ‘the computer
wouldn’t wait but would keep running the pro-
gram, modifying the behavior as specified by
the programmer as soon as changes were
made’ (Tanimoto 2013).
Towards greater improvisation or
efficiency?
Tanimoto has since elaborated two further
levels of liveness, which in addition to swifter
feedback response involve tactical and strategic
prediction. Made feasible through the use of
machine learning technology, statistical analysis
of programmer behaviour and ‘logical reason-
ing about meaningful choices’, Tanimoto argues
that in the new liveness level 5 (Tactically Pre-
dictive), ‘the computer not only runs the pro-
gram and responds, but also predicts the next
programmer action […] Instead of the environ-
ment lagging behind, or just keeping up with
the programmer, it stays a step ahead of the pro-
grammer’ (Tanimoto 2013). Level 6 would
involve further ‘intelligent inference of the pro-
grammer’s intentions or desires’ (Tanimoto
2013). For Tanimoto (2013), the ‘intelligence
required to make such predictions into the sys-
tem is an incorporation of one kind of agency—
the ability to act autonomously. Agency is com-
monly associated with life and liveness. One
might argue that here, liveness has spread
from the coding process to the tool itself’. In
one sense, these technical developments
promise towards improved human–machine
interfaces and improvisation, with predictive
coding (modelled on previous habits) supported
by faster response and processing times see-
mingly maximizing the potential for kairotic
flow, for increased spontaneity, for more
immediate coding ‘on the fly’. Rather than a
passive ‘tool’, the computer is afforded a degree
of decision-making responsibility, based on its
capacity to ‘second guess’, pre-empt or predict
the next step within a creative flow of action
as it ‘learns’ more about a performer’s prefer-
ences and tendencies.
Certainly, improvements in semantic feed-
back and the development of tactical prediction
and auto-completion could enable greater pos-
sibilities for improvising ‘in the moment’ or
‘in the zone’. However, such technological
advances might not necessarily give rise to
inventive forms of improvisatory liveness con-
ceived as a mode of live thinking-in-action, of
real invention and intervention. Indeed, the
‘pressure to perform’—even entertain—within
certain live coding performance contexts places
high demands on the performer. Under these
conditions, technical developments might
serve the betterment or perfection of a perform-
ance; that is, become instrumentalized at the
service of technical virtuosity, through reducing
the potential for error alongside increasing the
performer’s capacity for repetition of complex
sequences of coding. Here, the intrinsic motiv-
ation associated with flow states (heightened
value on the process and its challenges), gives
way to a form of extrinsic motivation dependent
on external factors including the ‘success’ of the
performance ‘product’, which arguably in turn
becomes measured according to the normative
criteria set within our contemporary neoliberal
culture of acceleration and immediacy: the era-
dication of error and delay in favour of more
easily attainable complexity and precision,
speed and efficiency, productivity and
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repeatability. Moreover, what might become
cultivated is a reliance on predictive options,
on a received standard or model developed for
a specific (predetermined) purpose or function.
The possibility of deviation from the norm, for
bespoke options, for modification or adaptation
becomes increasingly less of an option. Speed
and immediacy become mistaken for liveness;
increased efficiency leads to less waste, which
in turn can result in less risk. Indeed, rather
than measuring the success of human–compu-
ter improvisation based on how effectively tech-
nologies facilitate the process of ‘creative flow’,
the collaborative potential of improvising with
computers might also recognize the critical
value—even a different sense of computer
agency—within those moments of intransi-
gence and resistance.
Avoiding the predictive becoming
predictable
Since tactical prediction is based on a model of
statistical likelihood that differentiates between
the ‘least likely’ and ‘most likely’, how does
one resist the normatization and narrowing of
options within this model? How does one shift
from ‘what is’ or ‘has been’ to the potential of
‘what if’, ‘what else’ or even ‘what might be’?
Predictive technologies offer a form of digital
personalization based on existing patterns and
tendencies, but how does something new or
unexpected emerge within a predictive system?
How does one resist simply repeating the
already known? How does one avoid the predic-
tive becoming predictable? Indeed, as White
(1987, 17–18) asserts, the ‘impulse to repeat,
which ratifies the comfortable notion that
knowledge is in principle finite, encourages us
to speak not to the present occasion (the locus
of genuine novelty) but from (in imitation of)
the purely ideal constructs of our memories’.
A kairotic practice involves responding to each
situation anew, rather than based on responses
that are already rehearsed and ready in waiting.
Kairos is a contingent form of working
knowledge, not based on knowing how to deal
with a situation in advance, where the future
is predicted and prepared for. It is a form of
knowledge borne of the moment, from having
confidence that the right decision will be
made when required: it involves trusting (tôi
kairôi—‘to trust the moment’ [Hawhee 2002,
18]) that a response will be performed appropri-
ately and with skill at the propitious time. As
Hawhee states, ‘(t)he fleeting movement of
kairos necessitates a move away from a privile-
ging of “design” or preformulated principles’
(2004, 78), towards an emphasis on the ‘body,
timing, and a flexible, responsive intelligence’
(193).
One argument could be to assert that techno-
logical prediction reduces the need for ‘embo-
died confidence’, limiting the range of choice
to a pre-set menu of options conceived in
advance. However, since there are always a
finite number of possibilities for any coding
statement, the human performer is already
operating within given parameters. Moreover,
the human performer might all too quickly
return to a familiar coding repertoire within
the pressured context of live improvisation.
Alternatively, computer prediction does not
have to privilege the ‘most likely’ option, and
could instead be used tactically for actively cir-
cumventing the problem of ‘being predictable’.
The intent then is not to suggest that intelligent
machines increase predictability, but rather to
put pressure on the human performer’s capacity
and receptivity for seizing the new opportu-
nities made available through technological
developments. Indeed, whilst an embodied,
kairotic facility is developed through rhythmic,
repeated acts of habituation, as Glyn P. Norton
(2016, 268) asserts, this is ‘not about allegiance
to ingrained habits, but rather about our readi-
ness to repudiate the habitual, to break with
routine—to improvise’. In these terms, the
capacity for randomness made possible through
working with computers creates an unpredict-
able field of contingency, forcing the human
performer to ‘repudiate the habitual’, ‘to trust
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the moment’. Here, predictive technologies
might not always be deployed in the service of
more fluid even virtuoso—performance, but
instead, as with some modes of human collabor-
ation, serve to thwart familiar ways of working
by willfully avoiding the ‘most likely’ choices,
creating the working conditions for the new
and unexpected.
Biding one’s time: the critical of the
interval
Alternatively, rather than view the lag or latency
within coding as a problem or deficiency need-
ing to be reduced or resolved, is it possible to
conceive of critical potential within these inter-
ruptive intervals? Indeed, it is tempting to focus
on the ‘just–in-time’ nature of live coding’s
improvisational decision-making as one that is
necessarily connected to speed of thought
urgent in the now of the present as it is seized.
However, the performativity of timing and
timeliness within kairos is not performed in
haste, but also relies on the dual principles of
slowness and speed.5 Paradoxically perhaps,
the critical opportunity within the ‘opening’ of
kairos (ready to be seized) might only be dis-
cerned through a slowing down of habitual
flows and rhythms, thereby producing the
necessary quality of ‘attention’. Referring to
the work of Henri Bergson, Simon O’Sullivan
(2006, 45) argues that ‘attention’ involves ‘the
suspension of normal motor activity which in
itself allows other “planes” of reality to become
perceivable (this is an opening up to the world
beyond utilitarian interests). The event then
emerges from the world but from a world
usually imperceptible’. Moreover, as O’Sullivan
(2006, 37) states, it is this ‘“affective-gap”, or
“hesitancy” as Henri Bergson understood it,
between stimulus and response, which in itself
allows creativity to arise’.
Indeed, for some thinkers, the loss or eradi-
cation of thresholds and intervals results in
the impoverishment of lived experience.
According to Byung-Chul Han (2017, 37),
‘The totalization of Here and Now divests the
in-between spaces of any meaning. Today’s
experience is characterized by the fact that it
is very poor in transitions’. Advocating a critical
value for the interval he asserts that, ‘The time
between departure and arrival is an uncertain
time during which we must reckon with the
incalculable. But it is also a time of hope or
expectation, which prepares the arrival’ (Han
2017, 37). What might become lost in the eradi-
cation of technical latency, in the quest for a
speedier arrival at the intended ‘result’? Indeed,
for Han (2017, 37–38),
If the goal is the sole point of orientation, then
the spatial interval to be crossed before reach-
ing it is simply an obstacle to be overcome as
quickly as possible…Acceleration is the
attempt to make the temporal interval that is
needed for bridging the spatial interval disap-
pear altogether…Acceleration leads to a
semantic impoverishment of the world.
Han (2017, 38) specifically notes how ‘tech-
nological possibilities for recurrence destroy
the temporal interval which is responsible for
forgetting. They make what is past instan-
taneously retrievable and available. Nothing
must evade this instantaneous access’. Con-
ceived in these terms, tactical prediction could
be viewed as an attempt to ‘destroy the temporal
interval’ at the same time diminish the likeli-
hood of forgetting. For Han, against the eradica-
tion of intervals that creates a paradoxical
present with no duration, he argues a need for
in-between times, for the time of waiting,
since intervals not only delay but also allow us
to linger.
Indeed, lag is not only technological, since as
BrianMassumi (2015, 91) notes, it has been ver-
ified that there is a delay, an ‘infra-instant’
‘interval of perception’ (of a half-second)
between ‘the brain activity initiating a move-
ment and the conscious registering of the
“decision to act”’. In one sense, live coding
actively makes visible the interval—as an active,
expectant space wherein the working decisions
or working out is shown prior to its execution.
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The gap or delay between witnessing the gener-
ation of code and encountering its effects holds
certain dramatic tension even. Live coding
shows the deliberation as something is being
worked on, those threshold moments before
the decision to act or intervene, those indeter-
minate spaces of doubt or hesitation, the move-
ment of thought and fingers between this or that
option, between the yes and the no. It shows the
time that thinking-in-action takes. Moreover,
intervals leave space for listening, for the
response based on receptivity to the very con-
tingency of the situation. Against the privileging
of accelerated real-time performance—and nar-
rowing of the feedback loop between coding and
its execution through technological advance-
ment—can the gaps and lags within improvisa-
tional live coding be conceived as kairotic
intervals or even openings for biding one’s
time and for deciding when to act?
On not knowing: courting the
unexpected
The improvisatory nature of live coding
involves creating the germinal conditions
wherein something unplanned for or unantici-
pated might arise, something unknown or ser-
endipitous. It involves the cultivation of a
contingent form of present-activated future-
oriented imagination intent on courting rather
than thwarting the unexpected. Indeed, the
very principle of improvisation—of beginning
a performance without pre-set plan or script,
without knowing where it will lead—necessarily
embraces a sense of risk and uncertainty, the
stepping off or away from what is known
towards ‘not knowing’. The challenge then is
one of leaning towards rather than away from
the void of the not-yet-known; moreover, to
resist ‘filling’ that void too hastily with a reper-
toire of predicted forms and practised rhythms.
Rather than striving to successfully execute an
already known and rehearsed ‘script’ (the rep-
etition or revisitation of what already exists),
the criticality of live coding’s improvisational
performance could be conceived in relation to
the possibility therein for encountering some-
thing new; in the challenge, provocation and
even pleasure of the unexpected, the unpre-
dicted and unpredictable. Instead of smoothing
away the potential of risk, error or even failure
through technological development, emphasis
might instead be directed towards the creative
seizing of opportunity, accident, chance and
contingency within the liveness of human–
computer interaction. Indeed, whilst Csikszent-
mihalyi’s flow state does involve some sense of
control, he conceives this as the ‘paradox of
control’, since it is based on the ‘possibility,
rather than the actuality, of control’, or rather
‘not the sense of being in control, but the
sense of exercising control in difficult situations’
(2002, 61). In these terms, the desire for risk and
uncertainty within an improvisatory context do
not reflect the ‘pathological thrill that comes
from courting disaster’ (Csíkszentmihályi
2002, 61), nor the craving for danger in-and-
of-itself, but rather for the active challenge of
working with the contingent situation such
that an unexpected outcome is produced.
For many live coders, collaboration itself
emerges as a practice less for the pooling of
skills and resources, as a means for increasing
interruption, interference and chance encoun-
ters, the contingencies within co-production
or co-emergence willfully thwarting the possi-
bility of solo virtuosity. Can collaboration
between human coder and intelligent machine
be conceived in such terms, as a mode of impro-
visatory working with computers that—akin to
working with other humans—harnesses the
points of resistance and intransigence as pro-
ductive constraints, as desirable leverage against
which to work? Rather than simply an intelli-
gent tool (or even mindless tool box) that is
put to work by the coder-performer in the ser-
vice of better performance, how might
improved media and deep learning technologies
allow for heightened forms of co-improvisation
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that actively play with the capacities and resist-
ances of both performer and computational sys-
tem? Can technological improvements—
resulting in higher levels of computational live-
ness—be swerved from the teleology of
increased efficiency, productivity and repeat-
ability, alongside the limitation of error, to
become truly tested within the context of coding
performances that are playfully experimental,
that retain the potential of the unpredictable
or the unknown? I began the article by identify-
ing two tendencies observed within the bur-
geoning genre of live coding: the call for
greater immediacy of semantic feedback sup-
porting a faster, more fluid approach to impro-
visation, alongside an interest in a form of
improvisational performativity that harnesses
the unpredictable, the unexpected or as-yet-
unknown. Certainly, these tendencies could be
conceived as oppositional, however, to do so
would be to miss the opportunity—the kairos
even—for imagining their complementarity,
for developing new forms of human–computer
improvisation that creatively and critically test
their entanglement.
Notes
1. This article has been shaped by ideas emerging
through collaborative discussion with Alan
Blackwell, Geoff Cox, Alex McLean and
Thor Magnusson as part of the publishing
project Live Coding: A Users Guide, and
informed by a series interviews that I con-
ducted with Sam Aaron, Benoît and the Man-
delbrots, Shelly Knotts and Alex McLean as
part of the research for this project. I am
very grateful for the reviewers’ comments
that prompted a more nuanced line of
exploration within this article.
2. See Emma Cocker (2016) for more on the
relation of ‘thinking-in-action’ to live coding.
3. See International Journal of Performance Arts
and Digital Media, Live Coding 12 (2), 2016,
eds. Thor Magnusson and Kate Sicchio.
4. See also Luria (1973).
5. See also Tom Hall’s Slow Code Manifesto,
http://ludions.com/texts/2007a/.
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